

Diffusion of Innovation and Influence Maximization

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Lecture outline

- 1 Diffusion of innovation
- 2 Influence propagation models
 - Independent cascade model
 - Linear threshold model
- 3 Influence maximization problem
 - Submodular function optimization

"Diffusion" process


Propagation process:

- Viral propagation:
 - virus and infection
 - rumors, news
- Decision based models:
 - adoption of innovation
 - joining political protest
 - purchase decision

Local individual decision rules will lead to very different global results.
"microscopic" changes → "macroscopic" results

Ryan-Gross study

Ryan-Gross study of hybrid seed corn delayed adoption (after first exposure)




Information effect vs adopting of innovation

Ryan and Gross, 1943


Diffusion of innovation

Everett Rogers (sociologist) , " Diffusion of innovation" book, 1962



Influence response

Influence response: diminishing returns and threshold (critical mass)




$$P(n) = 1 - (1 - p)^n \quad P(b) = \delta(b > b_0)$$

Two models:

- Independent Cascade Model (diminishing returns)
- Linear Threshold Model (critical mass)

Live journal

10 mln members, joining groups



Backstrom, 2006


Independent cascade model

- Initial set of active nodes S_0
- Discrete time steps
- On every step an active node v can activate connected neighbor w with a probability $p_{v,w}$ (single chance)
- If v succeeds, w becomes active on the next time step
- Process runs until no more activations possible

If $p_{v,w} = p$ it is a particular type of SIR model, a node stays infected for only one step

Independent cascade model

Cascade - sequence of changes of behavior, "chain reaction"



Network coordination game

Local interaction game: Let u and v are players, and A and B are possible strategies


Payoffs

- if u and v both adopt behavior A, each get payoff $a > 0$
- if u and v both adopt behavior B, each get payoff $b > 0$
- if u and v adopt opposite behavior, each get payoff 0

		w
	A B	
v	A	a, a $0, 0$
	B	$0, 0$ b, b

Threshold model

Network coordination game, direct-benefit effect



Node v to make decision A or B , p - portion of type A neighbors to accept A :

$$a \cdot p \cdot d > b \cdot (1 - p) \cdot d$$

$$p \geq b/(a + b)$$


Threshold:

$$q = \frac{b}{a + b}$$

Accept new behavior A when $p \geq q$


Cascades

Cascade - sequence of changes of behavior, "chain reaction"



Let $a = 3$, $b = 2$, threshold $q = 2/(2+3) = 2/5$


Cascade propagation



- Let $a = 3$, $b = 2$, threshold $q = 2/(2 + 3) = 2/5$
- Start from nodes 7,8: $1/3 < 2/5 < 1/2 < 2/3$
- Cascade size - number of nodes that changed the behavior
- Complete cascade when every node changes the behavior

Cascades and clusters

Group of nodes form a cluster of density ρ if every node in the set has at least fraction ρ of its neighbors in the set



Both clusters of density $\rho = 2/3$. For cascade to get into cluster $q \leq 1 - \rho$.

images from Easley & Kleinberg

Linear threshold model



- Influence comes only from NN $N(i)$ nodes, w_{ij} influence $i \rightarrow j$
- Require $\sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ji} \leq 1$
- Each node has a random acceptance threshold from $\theta_i \in [0, 1]$
- Activation: fraction of active nodes exceeds threshold

$$\sum_{\substack{\text{active } \\ j \in N(i)}} w_{ji} > \theta_i$$

- Initial set of active nodes A_o , iterative process with discrete time steps
- Progressive process, only nonactive \rightarrow active

Cascades in random networks


- Global cascade (sufficiently large)
- Triggered by single node (or small set)
- Random graphs ER p_k
- Threshold distribution ϕ



Cascade window: a) homogenous threshold b) normal threshold distribution

Cascades in random networks


multiple seed nodes



(a) Empirical network; (b), (c) - randomized network

P. Singh, 2013

Influence maximization problem



- Initial set of active nodes A_o
- Cascade size $\sigma(A_o)$ - expected number of active nodes when propagation stops
- Find k -set of nodes A_o that produces maximal cascade $\sigma(A_o)$
- k -set of "maximum influence" nodes
- NP-hard


D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, 2003, 2005

Submodular functions

- Set function f is submodular, if for sets S, T and $S \subseteq T, \forall v \notin T$

$$f(S \cup \{v\}) - f(S) \geq f(T \cup \{v\}) - f(T)$$

- Function of diminishing returns ("concave property")
- Function f is monotone, $f(S \cup \{v\}) \geq f(S)$



Submodular functions

Theorem

Let F be a monotone submodular function and let S^* be the k -element set achieving maximal f .

Let S be a k -element set obtained by repeatedly, for k -iterations, including an element producing the largest marginal increase in f .

$$f(S) \geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right)f(S^*)$$

Nemhauser, Wolsey, and Fisher, 1978

Influence maximization

- Cascade size $\sigma(S)$ is submodular function (D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, 1993)

$$\sigma(S) \geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right)\sigma(S^*)$$

- Greedy algorithm for maximum influence set finds a set S such that its influence set $\sigma(S)$ is within $1/e = 0.367$ from the optimal (maximal) set $\sigma(S^*)$, $\sigma(S) \geq 0.629\sigma(S^*)$

Influence maximization

Approximation algorithm

Algorithm: Greedy optimization

Input: Graph $G(V, E)$, k

Output: Maximum influence set S


Set $S \leftarrow \emptyset$

for $i = 1 : k$ **do**

select $v = \arg \max_{u \in V \setminus S} (\sigma(S \cup \{u\}) - \sigma(S))$

$S \leftarrow S \cup \{v\}$


Experimental results



Independent cascade model



network: collaboration graph 10,000 nodes, 53,000 edges

D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, 2003



Linear threshold model

Computational considerations



Independent cascade model: influence spread and running time

W. Chen et.al, 2009

References

- Contagion, S. Morris, Review of Economic Studies, 67, p 57-78, 2000
- Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network, D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, 2003
- Influential Nodes in a Diffusion Model for Social Networks, D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, 2005
- Efficient Influence Maximization in Social Networks, W. Chen, Y. Wang, S, Yang, KDD 2009.
- A Simple Model of Global Cascades on Random Networks. D. Watts, 2002.