

# Spatial Model of Segregation

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


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"Dynamic Models of Segregation", Thomas Schelling, 1971

- Micro-motives and macro-behavior
- Personal preferences lead to collective actions
- Global patterns of spatial segregation from homophily at a local level
- Segregated race, ethnicity, native language, income
- Cities are strongly racially segregated. Are people that racists?
- Agent based modeling: agents, rules (dynamics), aggregation

# Segregation




Integrated pattern

Segregated pattern


# Racial segregation




New York




Washington




Chicago



Seattle




Los Angeles




Miami

# Bay area high school graduates



# 2012 US Presidential Elections Map



# Schelling's model of segregation

- Population consists of 2 types of agents
- Agents reside in the cells of the grid (2-dimensional geography of a city), 8 neighbors
- Some cells contain agents, some unpopulated
- Every agent wants to have at least some fraction of agents (threshold) of his type as neighbor (satisfied agent)
- On every round every unsatisfied agent moves to a satisfactory empty cell.
- Continues until everyone is satisfied or can't move

# Spatial segregation

1	2	3
4	X	5
6	7	8

satisfied agent

1	2	3
4	X	5
6	7	8

unsatisfied agent

- preference threshold  $\lambda = 3/7$



# Spatial segregation




Fig.7





Fig.10

T. Schelling, 1971


# Spatial segregation

vacancy 5%, tolerance  $\lambda = 0.5$



L. Gauvin et.al. 2009

# Spatial segregation



- $N$  - nodes,  $\theta$  - fraction of occupied by  $A$  and  $B$

$$n_A + n_B = \theta \cdot N$$

- Proportion of "unlike" nearest neighbors,  $k_i = \#NN$

$$P_i = \begin{cases} \#n_B/k_i, & \text{if } i \in A \\ \#n_A/k_i, & \text{if } i \in B \end{cases}$$

- Utility function,  $\lambda$  - sensitivity (tolerance threshold) level


$$u_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } P_i \leq \lambda \\ 0, & \text{if } P_i > \lambda \end{cases}$$

- Every node moves to maximize its utility

# Spatial segregation

x	x				
x	o		o		
x	x	o	o	o	
x	o			x	x
	o	o	x	x	x
		o	o	o	

(a)



(b)

- time steps  $1..T$
- At every time step randomly select an agent, compute utility
- If utility is  $u = 0$  move to an empty location to maximize utility
- Movements: 1) random location 2) nearest available location
- Repeat until either all utilities are maximized  $\sum_i u_i = \theta N$  or reaches "frozen" state, no place to move, then  $\sum_i u_i < \theta N$
- Total utility of society

$$U = \sum_i u_i$$

# Measuring segregation

- Schilling's solid mixing index

$$M = \frac{1}{n_A + n_B} \sum_i P_i$$

- Freeman's segregation index

$$F = 1 - \frac{e^*}{E(e^*)}$$

$e^* = \frac{e_{AB}}{(e_{AB} + e_{AA} + e_{BB})}$  - observed proportion of between group ties,


$E(e^*) = \frac{2n_A n_B}{(n_A + n_B)(n_A + n_B - 1)}$  - expected proportion for random ties

- Assortative mixing

$$Q = \frac{1}{2m} \sum_{ij} (A_{ij} - \frac{k_i k_j}{2m}) \delta(c_i, c_j)$$

# Spatial segregation on networks

Fixed degree  $k = 10$  neighboring graphs: regular, random, scale-free, fractal




Arnaud Banos, 2010




# Spatial segregation on networks

$$\lambda = 0.5, \theta = 0.8$$



Banos, 2010


# Spatial segregation on networks



Banos, 2010

# Spatial segregation on networks


$\nu = 10\%$  of random "noise" added for decision to avoid freezes



Banos, 2010

# Spatial segregation on networks


$\lambda = 0.3, \theta = 0.8$  Sensitivity to initial conditions



Banos, 2010

# Spatial segregation on networks

$$\nu = 0.1, \theta = 0.8, \lambda = 0.05$$



- Agents of two types A, B
- $\sigma_i = \pm 1$  if site  $i$  is occupied,  $\sigma_i = 0$  if empty
- System state vector:  $\sigma = (\sigma_1 \dots \sigma_N)$
- Adjacency matrix  $A_{ij}$
- Fraction of vacant sites  $\theta = 1/N \sum_i (1 - |\sigma_i|)$
- Proportion of "unlike" neighbours

$$P_i = \frac{\sum_j A_{ij} (|\sigma_i \sigma_j| - \sigma_i \sigma_j)}{\sum_j A_{ij} |\sigma_i \sigma_j|}$$

- Spatial segregation is taking place even though no individual agent is actively seeking it (minor preferences, high tolerance)
- Network structure does affect segregation
- Fixed characteristics (race) can become correlated with mutable (location)

- Dynamic Models of Segregation, Thomas C. Schelling, 1971
- Segregation in Social Networks, Linton Freeman, 1978
- Gauvin L, Vannimenus J, Nadal JP. Phase diagram of a Schelling segregation model. The European Physical Journal B, 70:293-304, 2009
- Arnaud Banos. Network effects in Schelling's model of segregation: new evidences from agent-based simulations. 2010